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PICKING UP WHERE KATCOFF LEFT OFF:
DEVELOPING A FRAMEWORK FOR A
CONSTITUTIONAL MILITARY CHAPLAINCY
CAPTAIN MALCOLM H. WILKERSON*
Abstract
Under existing precedent, portions of the military chaplaincy program
are unconstitutional. Although presenting at least the appearance of the
“establishment” of religion, the military chaplaincy program has never
been successfully challenged on constitutional grounds—despite its history
of more than two centuries. The only court that has directly confronted the
issue upheld the military chaplaincy based on what appears to be a
counter-intuitive application of the Free Exercise Clause. Namely, the
military chaplaincy program ensures the free exercise rights of service
members who, because of their military service, would otherwise be
deprived of access to religious services. And indeed, when a military
assignment takes a service member to rural or international locations, that
military assignment may reduce or eliminate the service member’s access
to religious services. Consequently, the Free Exercise Clause at least
allows the government to take action to alleviate those hindrances, which
the government does by providing the military chaplaincy program. But
those obstacles simply do not exist for many service members, for instance
those assigned to non-deployable units in the urban United States who
benefit from ready access to local religious resources. And with respect to
these service members, the military’s chaplaincy program amounts to an
impermissible advancement of religion and, as such, cannot survive
constitutional muster. Thus because government-sponsored (or supported)
religious accommodation is permissible only when government action
encumbers religious free exercise, service members’ access to government
religious resources must be more carefully circumscribed to those
circumstances in which it is genuinely a government-imposed burden that
the government’s military chaplains relieves. Therefore, to meet its
constitutional obligations, the Department of Defense (DoD) must make
some effort to distinguish between units that are and units that are not
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subject to a government-imposed burden on its members religious free
exercise.
Introduction
The U.S. military chaplaincy is, perhaps, the quintessential (or, viewed
from a different perspective, the oldest continuous) example of
government-sponsored religion. Pursuant to congressional command, the
military selects, trains, equips, and ultimately commissions chaplain
candidates, and then pays for those chaplains’ operating expenses, monthly
salaries, benefits, and retirement with congressional appropriations.1
Military chaplains are required by statute to provide weekly religious
services to military personnel2—a mandate that those chaplains meet in
government-funded buildings using government-purchased hymnals to sing
hymns while sitting on government-owned pews on nearly every military
base in the world.3 In short, the military chaplaincy is exactly the type of
government sponsorship of religion that the First Amendment’s “Congress
shall make no law” Establishment Clause purports to prevent.4
Despite the apparent constitutional infirmity inherent to such a program,
only one federal case has directly confronted this issue.5 In 1985, two
Harvard Law students, Joel Katcoff and Allen Wieder, challenged the Army
chaplaincy on Establishment Clause grounds.6 In Katcoff v. Marsh, the
Second Circuit held that the U.S. Army chaplain corps was a
constitutionally permissible exception to the Establishment Clause and that
the U.S. Constitution may even require the establishment of the Army
chaplaincy to ensure the free exercise rights of soldiers.7 After losing at the
appellate level and facing the possibility of paying the U.S. government’s
court fees, Katcoff and Wieder cut a deal with the government: in exchange
for discontinuing the litigation, the U.S. government would not seek to
recoup its legal fees.8 Thus, the only federal court case that litigated the

1. See infra Part III.
2. See infra notes 104-106 and accompanying text.
3. Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223, 228-29 (2d Cir. 1985) (noting that the Army had
more than 500 chapels and purchased religious texts and other religious accouterments).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
5. See Katcoff, 755 F.2d at 233.
6. Id. at 224-25.
7. Id. at 237.
8. ISRAEL DRAZIN & CECIL B. CURREY, FOR GOD AND COUNTRY: THE HISTORY OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO THE ARMY CHAPLAINCY 203-05 (1995).
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military’s chaplaincy corps on the merits settled, never making it to the U.S.
Supreme Court.
To date, there has been no further litigation on this issue, leaving critical,
lingering constitutional questions. Was the Katcoff court correct in deeming
the military chaplaincy a constitutionally permissible accommodation of
service members’ free exercise rights? And if so, should the expanse of this
“establishment” be more narrowly tailored? More specifically, do urban
military bases need military chaplains to provide for the religious needs of
service members? And if they do not, is the assignment of chaplains to
those installations unconstitutional?
Because most court challenges to the military chaplaincy after Katcoff
have been on other issues, such as personnel policy in the Navy or public
prayer,9 this article will re-examine some of the issues raised but never
resolved in Katcoff. Part I provides an overview of Katcoff v. Marsh. Part
II examines the applicable constitutional law, statutory law, and federal case
law involving the Religion Clauses and the U.S. military. Part III provides
an overview of the structure and purpose of the military chaplaincy. Part IV
examines potential facial attacks to the military chaplaincy as an
accommodation of free exercise. Part V focuses on whether the military
chaplaincy is a mandatory, permissible, or prohibited accommodation of
service members’ free exercise rights. And Part VI discusses several
potential solutions to the constitutional issues raised in the foregoing parts.
I. Katcoff v. Marsh
Katcoff v. Marsh is the only federal appellate court case ever to address a
constitutional challenge to the Army chaplaincy.10 In the opinion, the
Second Circuit began its constitutional discussion with a historical
examination of the Army chaplain corps.11 The court noted that military
chaplains were similarly situated to legislative chaplains, who the Supreme
Court deemed constitutional in Marsh v. Chambers,12 finding specifically
that both military and legislative chaplains shared a comparable history.13
9. See, e.g., Veitch v. England, 471 F.3d 124 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Chaplaincy of Full
Gospel Churches v. England, 454 F.3d 290 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
10. Katcoff, 755 F.2d at 225.
11. Id.
12. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786 (1983).
13. Katcoff, 755 F.2d at 232. The author respectfully disagrees with the court’s findings.
There are critical differences between legislative and military chaplains. The Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of legislative chaplains in Marsh v. Chambers due to the unbroken
history of legislative chaplains, the briefness of the nonsectarian invocations, and the setting
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But not content with the similarity to the legislative chaplaincy, the Second
Circuit proceeded to examine the chaplaincy under the Lemon Test. The
Lemon Test is a conjunctive test that is used to determine whether a
government action may contravene the Establishment Clause.14 Under that
test, to uphold a government action, the action must: (1) be for a “secular
legislative purpose,” (2) have a primary effect that “neither advances nor
inhibits religion,” and (3) create a result that does not “foster excessive
governmental entanglement with religion.’”15 In a mere three sentences
totaling eighty-four words of analysis, the court held that the Army
chaplaincy flunked the Lemon Test.16
Despite the chaplaincy’s failure to pass the Lemon Test, the court turned
to other factors, holding the Army chaplaincy could not be considered “in a
sterile vacuum.”17 Specifically the court went on to state that the
that allowed legislatures to come and go freely. 463 U.S. at 792. Taken together, these were
enough for the Supreme Court to uphold the constitutionality of legislative chaplains. Id. at
793-94. But none of those factors is present in the military chaplaincy. First, though the
military chaplaincy has a long history, predating the U.S. Constitution, it is not an
“unambiguous and unbroken” history of acceptance. Id. at 783; see also George Washington,
General Orders (July 9, 1776), in 5 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON FROM THE
ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPT SOURCES 1745-1799, at 244 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1932). For a more
exhaustive history, see In re England, 375 F.3d 1169 (D.C. Cir. 2004), or Rigdon v. Perry, 962
F. Supp. 150 (D.D.C. 1997). In fact, James Madison, often referred to as the “Father of the
Constitution,” opposed the military chaplain corps. James Madison, Detached Memoranda, in
Madison’s “Detached Memoranda,” 1946 WM. & MARY Q. 534, 558-60 (Elizabeth Fleet, ed.)
(condemning public money for military chaplains); see also Timothy L. Hall, Roger Williams
and the Foundations of Religious Liberty, 71 B.U. L. REV. 455, 511 (1991). Second, the
Chambers v. Marsh Court placed a premium on the belief that legislative chaplains were not a
“real threat” to the Establishment Clause. 463 U.S. at 791. There are relatively few legislative
chaplains and the total outlay of funding for them is small. For example, in 2003 the U.S.
Senate Chaplain’s salary was $134,000 a year and the U.S. House Chaplain’s salary was
$153,200 a year. MILDRED AMER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 20427, HOUSE AND SENATE
CHAPLAINS 2 (2003). In contrast, the Katcoff court found the Army chaplaincy cost over $80
million annually in the 1980s. 755 F.2d at 229. Additionally, the military chaplaincy employs
almost 4,000 government-funded clergy. Jennifer H. Svan, Troops: Loss Will Be Felt When
Air Force Cuts Chaplain Corps by 15 Percent, STARS & STRIPES, May 17, 2010, available at
http://www.stripes.com/news/troops-loss-will-be-felt-when-air-force-cuts-chaplain-corps-by15-percent-1.102746 (identifying over 4,000 chaplains across service branches without
including Navy Reserve or Air National Guard chaplains). Finally, in the author’s experience,
military chaplains regularly give invocations at official, mandatory military events, such as
change of commands, at which a service members’ presence can be required.
14. Katcoff, 755 F.2d at 232.
15. Id. (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971)).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 232-33.
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Establishment Clause must be interpreted in light of other parts of the
Constitution, namely the Free Exercise Clause and the War Powers
Clause.18 Regarding the Free Exercise Clause, the court held that the
military chaplaincy was actually necessary to avert any violation of service
members’ free exercise rights when those service members were
transplanted by government order to areas in which they could not freely
practice their religion, such as rural parts of the United States and foreign
countries.19 In this light, the court held that the Army chaplaincy was not so
much an Establishment Clause violation but a means to prevent a potential
infringement of the Free Exercise Clause.20
Using the Establishment Clause as a foundation—and relying on the
Supreme Court’s traditional deference to military policies regarding
readiness and national security under the War Powers Clause21—the Second
Circuit developed a novel test to determine the constitutionality of the
Army chaplaincy: “whether, after considering practical alternatives, the
chaplaincy program is relevant to and reasonably necessary for the Army's
conduct of our national defense.”22 Under that test, the court rejected the
appellants’ alternate proposal—a volunteer, deployable civilian clergy—
concluding that the volunteer chaplain corps was not viable (or practical).23
The court then held that the Army chaplaincy readily met the standards of
the new test.24 Taken together, the War Powers Clause, Free Exercise
Clause, and the historical pedigree of the Army chaplaincy, overcame the
limitations of the Establishment Clause, and the Second Circuit upheld the
Army chaplaincy as facially constitutional.25

18. Id. at 233 (discussing the War Powers Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11, and
Free Exercise Clause, U.S. CONST. amend. I).
19. Id. at 234.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 233-34.
22. Id. at 235. As described by the Court, “[C]aution dictates that when a matter
provided for by Congress in the exercise of its war power and implemented by the Army
appears reasonably relevant and necessary to furtherance of our national defense it should be
treated as presumptively valid and any doubt as to its constitutionality should be resolved as
a matter of judicial comity in favor of deference to the military's exercise of its discretion.”
Id. at 234-35 (citing Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64-68 (1981)).
23. Id. at 236.
24. Id. at 236-37.
25. Id. at 235.
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That holding did not end the case, however. The Second Circuit
remanded the matter in part to determine in which areas the Army
chaplaincy was perhaps not “relevant to and reasonably necessary for the
conduct of our national defense”—namely, the chaplaincy’s presence in
D.C. and other urban population centers.26 The court specifically directed
the district court to determine the necessity of Army chaplains at military
bases near these large population centers, as well as the necessity of the
provision of religious services to retired military personnel.27 But faced
with the prospect of paying the U.S. government’s legal fees, the appellants
settled, agreeing not to continue the case in return for a waiver of the
government’s legal-fees claim.28 Ultimately, that settlement left this asapplied challenge to the chaplaincy yet unanswered.29
II. Religion Clauses Law
An evaluation of the military chaplaincy in light of the requirements of
the Religion Clauses requires an understanding of the constitutional tests
courts have developed to enforce those clauses. This section provides an
overview of those sometimes contradictory and conflicting tests.
A. Establishment Clause
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment provides, “Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.”30 Despite the
apparent simplicity of this mandate, the Supreme Court’s holdings on this
ten-word declarative sentence are in (perhaps hopeless) disarray.31 Indeed,
one legal commentator cited ten different judicial approaches to the
Establishment Clause.32 Another legal commentator observed that “[t]hese
judge-made tests have proved to be of little use in predicting how actual
cases before the Court will be decided, as well as to be of limited durability,
26. Id. at 238.
27. Id. at 237-38.
28. DRAZIN & CURREY, supra note 8, at 203-05.
29. Id.
30. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
31. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 861
(1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that “our Establishment Clause jurisprudence is in
hopeless disarray”); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 644 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Our
Religion Clause jurisprudence has become bedeviled . . . by reliance on formulaic
abstractions that are not derived from, but positively conflict with, our long-accepted
constitutional traditions.”).
32. Steven G. Gey, Reconciling the Supreme Court's Four Establishment Clauses, 8 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 725, 725 (2006).
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as the test in current favor waxes and wanes even among individual
Justices.”33
The perhaps aptly named Lemon Test34 is the most commonly known
and—historically speaking—the most widely used test in Establishment
Clause jurisprudence. This test, summarily applied in Katcoff, has largely
fallen out of favor at the Supreme Court level and is no longer applied in
many relevant cases,35 but it has not been expressly overruled.36 The
inconsistent application of the test has prompted some expressions of
frustration from the justices themselves. For example, as Justice Scalia
observed: “When we wish to strike down a practice it forbids, we invoke it;
when we wish to uphold a practice it forbids, we ignore it entirely.”37 And
in 2005, a dissenting Justice Breyer, perhaps despairing of any legal
standard, stated: “I see no test-related substitute for the exercise of legal
judgment.”38
Because the Court’s threshold question in evaluating the constitutionality
of the military chaplaincy must be which Establishment Clause test to
apply, and because it is not clear which Establishment Clause test the Court
would ultimately invoke, the constitutionality of the chaplaincy must
ultimately be considered in light of all of the tests. With this in mind, I
review some of these tests below.
1. The Lemon Test
The basic aim of the Lemon Test is to prevent “sponsorship, financial
support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.”39
The Lemon Test is a “strict-scrutiny-lite” test. To sustain an action, the test
demands the presence of all the following factors: (1) the government
action must have a “secular legislative purpose,” (2) the government
33. Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint on
Governmental Power, 84 IOWA L. REV. 1, 11 n.38 (1998).
34. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
35. See, e.g., Weisman, 505 U.S. 577; Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
36. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 686 (2005) (upholding a Ten
Commandments display in Texas and stating that Lemon was “not useful” in dealing with
the display).
37. Lynn S. Branham, “The Devil Is in the Details”: A Continued Dissection of the
Constitutionality of Faith-Based Prison Units, 6 AVE MARIA L. REV. 409, 412 (2009)
(quoting Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 399 (1993)
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)).
38. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 700 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
39. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y.C., 397 U.S. 664,
668 (1970)).
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action’s “primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits
religion,” and finally, (3) the action “must not foster excessive government
entanglement with religion.”40
To amplify these requirements, the “secular-purpose” prong evaluates the
action objectively in light of the surrounding circumstances, including the
action’s implementation, history, and logical effects.41 If there is more than
one plausible purpose, the primary purpose must be secular.42 Second, the
“primary-effect” prong seeks to prevent government action that results in
the promotion of religion either intentionally or unintentionally. To put it
another way, as long as the inhibition or advancement of religion is only a
secondary effect of the government action, it is permissible under this
prong.43 Finally the “excessive-entanglement” prong evaluates the duration
and depth of the government’s continued involvement in the action’s
beneficiary in order to administer the action.44 In determining excessive
entanglement, courts examine the type of institution benefitted, the nature
of the government aid, and the resulting relationship between the
government and religious institution.45
2. Endorsement Test
Justice O’Connor’s Endorsement Test is one of many alternatives to the
Lemon Test. This test is based on the premise that the fundamental social ill
that the Establishment Clause seeks to cure is the government’s
endorsement of a religion, which, according to Justice O’Connor, “sends a
message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the
political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they
are insiders, favored members of the political community.”46 Using this
view, the Endorsement Test examines whether a reasonable and informed
observer would view the government’s action as an endorsement of
religion.47 In evaluating such claims, the Court assumes that this reasonable
and informed observer “embod[ies] a community ideal of social [and
40. Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223, 232 (2d Cir. 1985) (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at
612-13).
41. McCreary Cnty., Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 861-62 (2005).
42. Id. at 862-63.
43. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652 (2002).
44. See, e.g., Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 688 (1971).
45. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615.
46. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (holding
city's inclusion of a crèche, among many secular objects in holiday display in a private
shopping area, was constitutional).
47. Id.
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rational] judgment” and is aware of the government action’s history and
“place in our Nation’s cultural landscape”48—perhaps an “idealized”
depiction of a Supreme Court justice. Some judges have taken to folding
the Endorsement Test into the Lemon Test, using it to analyze the neitherinhibit-nor-advance-religion factor.49 Still, the federal appeals courts
generally continue to prefer the Lemon Test alone.50
3. Coercion Test
The Court has also applied a Coercion Test to the Establishment Clause.
The Coercion Test holds that, at a minimum, the “government may not
coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise.”51 Courts
most often use this test in school-prayer cases. In 2000, for example, the
Court cited students’ susceptibility to peer pressure when it struck down a
student-led but government-sanctioned prayer at a nonmandatory high
school football game.52
4. Neutrality Test
The Neutrality Test holds that a government action is permissible if it is
neutral; the government action may neither favor nor disadvantage
religion.53 Despite its apparent simplicity, the Supreme Court has used this
test only once.
B. The Free Exercise Clause
Heavily relied upon by the Katcoff court, the Free Exercise Clause
provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise
48. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 35 (2004) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
49. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69-70 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment); ACLU of N.J. v. Black Horse Pike Reg'l Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 1486-87
(3d Cir. 1996).
50. See, e.g., Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 370 (4th Cir. 2003); Ingebretsen v.
Jackson Pub. Sch. Dist., 88 F.3d 274, 279-80 (5th Cir. 1996).
51. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992).
52. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 312 (2000).
53. See McCreary Cnty., Ky. V. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005) (“The
touchstone for our [Establishment Clause] analysis is the principle that the ‘First
Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and between
religion and non-religion.’” (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968));
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 8 (1993) (“[W]e have consistently held
that government programs that neutrally provide benefits to a broad class of citizens defined
without reference to religion are not readily subject to an Establishment Clause challenge
just because sectarian institutions may also receive an attenuated financial benefit.”).
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[of religion].”54 But as the Court has held, the clause does not require “that
in every and all respects there shall be a separation of Church and State,”55
nor does it permit the action to completely prohibit the free exercise of
religion.56 In analyzing free exercise claims, the Court employs one of two
tests depending on whether the government action targets religion or is
neutral toward religion.57
The Constitution prohibits government action that is aimed at hindering
religion unless that action can survive a strict-scrutiny analysis, which
means the action is only permissible if it is narrowly tailored to advance a
compelling government interest.58 If the action’s purpose is to suppress
religion or a religious practice, the action targets religion and is therefore
subject to strict scrutiny.59 To determine the government’s purpose in an
action, courts examine the plain language of the statute, the historical
context of the case, and the effect of the law.60 If, after applying those
factors, the Court determines that the action targets religion, it is subject to
strict scrutiny.61 These types of claims are uncommon.
Government action not specifically aimed at religion can still implicate
the Free Exercise Clause if that action burdens religion by either prohibiting
religious conduct that the religion requires or compelling conduct that the
religion prohibits.62 To uphold a government action imposing such a
burden, the action must be neutral and generally applicable. A government
action is neutral if it advances a legitimate government interest and is not

54. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
55. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952).
56. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
532 (1993) (“Petitioners allege an attempt to disfavor their religion because of the religious
ceremonies it commands, and the free exercise Clause is dispositive in our analysis.”).
57. See, e.g., id. at 577 (law aimed at Santeria religion); Emp’t Div., Dep't of Human
Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877-78 (1990) (law neutral toward Native American
religion), superseded by statute, Religious Land Use & Institutionalized Persons Act of
2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803, as recognized in Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S. Ct.
1651 (2011).
58. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 531-32.
59. Id. at 533.
60. Id. at 533, 535, 540.
61. Id. at 531-32.
62. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (law prohibiting polygamy limits religious practice of
those whose religion require polygamy); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (law
requiring tax limits practice of those whose religion opposes certain government programs).
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targeted at religion.63 A government action is generally applicable when the
burden is not solely applied to those whose conduct is religiously based.64
C. Tension Between the Two Religion Clauses
Although there is an apparent tension between the logical extremes of the
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses (i.e., protecting the free exercise
right may implicate the establishment prohibition),65 the Court has ruled
that there is space for religious-accommodation legislation.66 Using this
“play in the joints,” the government may act in limited ways that facilitate
religion (or religious activity) without violating the Establishment Clause.67
But even in this space, government accommodation can still be
problematic in two situations. First, the government cannot accommodate
religion if there is no “special” burden on religion, as when the government
exempts religious organizations from a publication sales tax of general
applicability.68 Such treatment prefers religion to non-religion. Second, the
government’s accommodation cannot favor some religions over others, as
when gerrymandering a particular school district for a particular sect with
no indication that it would be done for any other school district.69 But when
conflicts do arise between the Free Exercise and Establishment Clause
concerns, Cutter v. Wilkinson gives the Free Exercise Clause a “‘preferred
position’ in our constitutional order”70 and the upper hand over
establishment considerations.71
63. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 533.
64. See id. at 542-43.
65. Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y.C., 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970) (describing the
tension in finding a “neutral course between the two Religion Clauses, both of which are cast
in absolute terms, and either of which, if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to clash
with the other”).
66. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 717-18 (2004) (holding that a scholarship program
prohibiting recipients from pursuing a theology degree is permissible under the
Establishment Clause and does not violate the Free Exercise Clause).
67. Id. at 718-19 (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 669).
68. See Tex. Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 23 (1989).
69. See Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 705
(1994).
70. Steven Goldberg, Cutter and the Preferred Position of the Free Exercise Clause, 14
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1403, 1416 (2006) (citations omitted).
71. See id. at 1404; see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1201 (2d ed. 1988) (“[T]he free exercise principle should be dominant when it conflicts with
the anti-establishment principle. Such dominance is the natural result of tolerating religion
as broadly as possible rather than thwarting at all costs even the faintest appearance of
establishment.”).
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D. Religious Accommodation in the Military
Like most constitutional rights, the courts have been reluctant to fully
extend the principles of the Religious Clauses case law to the military.72
Historically, courts have upheld military restrictions on service members’
individual rights73 based largely on the War Powers Clause74 and on the
perceived judicial inability to determine the impact a court’s decision will
have on military discipline.75 The Supreme Court has deemed the military a
“special context” where burdens on free exercise rights are permissible if
rationally related to a legitimate military objective.76 This means a service
member in the military retains his free exercise right, but this right can be
reasonably limited due to military necessity.77
In determining what military objectives are legitimately classified as
“military necessities,” the Court generally defers to the military’s judgment
of what constitutes a necessity.78 During times of war, courts have usually
granted more deference to military decisions.79 Deference, however, does
not mean complete acceptance of the military’s opinion.80 As illustrated by

72. See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (rejecting Jewish officer’s
challenge to an Air Force regulation forbidding the wearing of headgear indoors, including
his yarmulke, and accepting the U.S. Air Force’s claim that uniformity in appearance was
essential to good order and discipline); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (holding
male draft was constitutional using lesser scrutiny than in non-military gender discrimination
cases); Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980) (upholding Air Force regulation requiring a
commander’s prior approval before an airmen could circulate petitions on a military base).
73. See, e.g., John A. Carr, Free Speech in the Military Community: Striking a Balance
Between Personal Rights and Military Necessity, 45 A.F. L. REV. 303, 312 (1998) (noting
the grand jury provision of the Fifth Amendment and a qualification of the search and
seizure protection of the Fourth Amendment to illustrate free speech protections in the
military are not as broad as for civilians).
74. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 11.
75. Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 181, 186-87
(1962).
76. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974) (“[T]he military is, by necessity, a
specialized society separate from civilian society.”).
77. Cf. Rostker, 453 U.S. at 70 (“[D]eference does not mean abdication.”).
78. Carlos C. Huerta & Schuyler C. Webb, Religious Accommodation in the Military, in
MANAGING DIVERSITY IN THE MILITARY: RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES FROM THE DEFENSE EQUAL
OPPORTUNITY MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE 85-86 (Mickey R. Dansby et al. eds., 2001).
79. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). But see Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
80. See Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 370 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“To be
sure, general and admirals, not federal judges, are expert about military needs. But it is
equally true that judges, not military officers, possess the competence and authority to
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the Supreme Court’s Hamdi v. Rumsfeld decision, even in war, the judiciary
does not abdicate its responsibility for judicial review.81 But military
necessity does not need to be proven with live testimony at trial; instead, it
may be established from affidavits and declarations of military authorities.82
The limits of military necessity—what it entails and when it can be
invoked—in this and other contexts has never been defined by the Supreme
Court.83
Similarly, courts have also recognized that the Establishment Clause
would severely limit service members’ ability to exercise their religions if
applied as it is in the civilian context. Unlike civilians, the government
exercises far more control over service members than it does over civilians.
This control includes the place of service members’ assignments, travel,
deployments to foreign countries, etc. Yet despite the reality of this control
and its impact, if applied strictly, the Establishment Clause could prevent
the government from building houses of worship, employing military
chaplains, or otherwise expending federal funds in an effort to
accommodate service members’ religious needs.84 Given the government’s
undeniable control, many members of the armed forces may have partially
or completely restricted access to religious services unless the government
actively supplies those services. “The religious establishments that result
[from such government action] are minor and seem consistent with, and
indeed required by, the overall purpose of the First Amendment’s Religion
Clauses, which is to promote religious liberty.”85 In short, the government
can—and sometimes must—provide aid or resources to alleviate significant
government restrictions on an individual’s ability to freely practice his or
her religion.86

interpret and apply the First Amendment.”); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507
(2004).
81. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533 (holding that an American citizen designated as an “enemy
combatant” by the military retains his due process rights even in times of war).
82. John A. Carr, The Voice from the Pulpit: Can the Department of Defense Regulate
the Political Speech of Military Chaplains? (Oct. 28, 1998) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA358531.
83. Huerta & Webb, supra note 78, at 86.
84. Cf. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005); Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223, 223
(2d Cir. 1985).
85. Johnson-Bey v. Lane, 863 F.2d 1308, 1312 (7th Cir. 1988).
86. Scott Roberts, The Constitutionality of Prison-Sponsored Religious Therapeutic
Communities, 15 REGENT U. L. REV. 69, 72 (2003); see also Cutter, 544 U.S. at 720.
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III. The Military Chaplaincy
A. Introduction
The military chaplain corps is composed of three different departments:
the Army Chaplain Corps, the Navy Chaplain Corps, and the Air Force
Chaplain Corps.87 The Navy Chaplains Corps, in addition to providing
chaplain services to the Navy, provides chaplains to the Coast Guard,
Marine Corps, and Merchant Marines.88 Department of Defense Directives
and Instructions provide the broad framework for the operation of each
chaplain corps.89 But to varying degrees, each of the three military
departments promulgate additional regulations for their own chaplain corps.
Regarding personnel make-up, the military chaplain corps is largely male
and Christian.90 As of 2010, there were over 4,000 military chaplains
across all three military departments’ active, reserve, and National Guard
components.91 Roughly one-third of all military chaplains belong to either
the Southern Baptist, Pentecostal, or National Association of Evangelicals
denominations.92 In 2013, less than 1% of military chaplains were not of
87. U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 165-1, ARMY CHAPLAIN CORPS ACTIVITIES, para. 1-4.c
(Dec. 3, 2009) [hereinafter AR 165-1]; U.S. DEP’T OF AIR FORCE, DIR. 52-1, CHAPLAIN
SERVICE (Oct. 2, 2006) [hereinafter AFPD 52-1]; U.S. DEP’T OF NAVY, SEC’Y OF NAVY
INSTR. 1730.7B, RELIGIOUS MINISTRY SUPPORT WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
para. 4.a (Oct. 12, 2000) [hereinafter SECNAV 1730.7B].
88. U.S. DEP’T OF NAVY, INSTR. 1730.1D, RELIGIOUS MINISTRY IN THE NAVY, para. 6.a
(1) (May 6, 2003).
89. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., INST. 1300.17, ACCOMMODATION OF RELIGIOUS PRACTICES
WITHIN THE MILITARY SERVICES (Feb. 10, 2009) [hereinafter DODI 1300.17]; U.S. DEP’T OF
DEF., INST. 1304.28, GUIDANCE FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF CHAPLAINS FOR THE MILITARY
DEPARTMENTS (Aug. 7, 2007) [hereinafter DODI 1304.28]; U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIR.
1304.19, APPOINTMENT OF CHAPLAINS FOR THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS (Apr. 23, 2007)
[hereinafter DODD 1304.19].
90. Taking the active Army chaplain corps as an example, in 2012, the Army chaplain
corps is only 6% female. Sung-eun Kim, Few of the Few to Pray, DEP’T OF THE ARMY (April
18, 2012), http://www.army.mil/article/78042/Few_of_the_few_to _pray. But in contrast, the
Active Army Commissioned Officer Corps (of which female military chaplains are a subset) as
a whole was 16.9% female in 2008. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, ARMY DEMOGRAPHICS: FY08 ARMY
PROFILE (Sept. 30, 2008), available at http://www. armyg1.army.mil/HR/docs/demographics/
FY08%20Army%20Profile.pdf. Notably, as commonly known, some faiths (e.g., the Roman
Catholic Church) forbid female clergy.
91. See Svan, supra note 13.
92. Tim Townsend, Military Chaplains Are Faith Mismatch for Personnel They Serve, ST.
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Jan. 9, 2011, 12:05 A.M.), http://www.stltoday.com/ lifestyles/faith-andvalues/military-chaplains-are-faith-mismatch-for-personnel-they-serve/article_19c66ee6-82b859f7-b3d5-fd3cc05bc538.html.
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the Christian faith.93 In 2009, the Army commissioned its first Buddhist
Chaplain.94 And in 2011, the Army commissioned its first Hindu Chaplain.95
Although the military’s longstanding practice has been to attempt to
apportion chaplains according to the faith demographics of the military as a
whole, that practice has been mostly aspirational.
The present
apportionment of chaplains by religious affiliation does not match the
present demographics of service members’ religious affiliation.96 For
example, in 2013, 25% of service members were Roman Catholic, but
Roman Catholic priests comprised only 8% of the chaplaincy.97 Further,
while Southern Baptists comprised only 1% of all military members,
Southern Baptist pastors represented 16% of the chaplain corps.98 One
federal district court took it as given that “it would be ‘impossible in any
given military unit or community to provide a chaplain for each faith group
represented by its members.’”99 The report further determined that using
proportional representation to determine the composition of the military
chaplaincy was impractical, inefficient, and would create instability within

93. In August 2013, there were only a total of thirty-three military chaplains from the Jewish,
Islamic, Buddhist, Baha’i, and Hindu faiths. Rita Nakashima Brock, The Military Chaplaincy
Needs to Become More Diverse, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 16, 2013, 1:03 P.M.), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/rita-nakashima-brock-ph-d/the-military-chaplaincy-n_b_3759033.html.
94. Bob Smietana, Former Marine Is First Buddhist Army Chaplain, ARMY TIMES,
Sept. 8, 2009, available at http://www.armytimes.com/article/20090908/NEWS/909080304/
Former-Marine-first-Buddhist-Army-chaplain.
95. Chris Carroll, Military’s First Hindu Chaplain Brings a Diverse Background,
STARS & STRIPES, Jun. 2, 2011, available at http://www.stripes.com/news/military-s-firsthindu-chaplain-brings-a-diverse-background-1.145455. If the absence of a Hindu chaplain
symbol in the military department uniform regulations is an indication, then the Air Force
and Navy do not plan on having a Hindu chaplain in the near future. Neither the Air Force
nor the Navy have religious symbols for chaplains beyond the cross, tablets, half moon, and
dharma. See U.S. DEP’T OF AIR FORCE, INSTR. 36-2903, DRESS AND PERSONAL APPEARANCE
OF AIR FORCE PERSONNEL 173 (Mar. 1, 2013); U.S. DEP’T OF NAVY, DIR. 15665, UNITED
STATES NAVY UNIFORM REGULATION, para. 4102(3) (July 2011).
96. Jeff Sharlet, Jesus Killed Mohammed: The Crusade for a Christian Military,
HARPER’S MAG., May 2009, at 38.
97. Paul D. Shinkman, The Catholic Crunch: Inside the Shortage of Catholic Military
Priests, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Oct. 30, 2013), http://www.usnews.com/news/
articles/2013/10/30/the-catholic-crunch-inside-the-shortage-of-catholic-military-priests.
98. Jason G. Riley, For God or Country? Religious Tensions Within the United States
Military 18 (Dec. 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/
ADA462635.
99. Larsen v. U.S. Navy, 486 F. Supp. 2d 11, 32 (D.D.C. 2007) (citation omitted).
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the chaplain corps.100 Moreover, “[e]ven if the military chaplaincy
attempted to provide a chaplain for each faith group represented in the
military . . . only a few members would have access to a chaplain of their
particular faith because of the highly mobile, organizationally-dependent
nature of the military and its global commitment.”101 As a result, instead of
focusing on a faith-group representation based chaplaincy, selections must
center on practical criteria such as who is willing to sign up to serve.
Despite the relative homogeneity of the military chaplaincy, each
chaplain is also expected to meet the free exercise needs of a religiously
diverse group of service members. For example, the Army stipulates that
“[c]haplains will administer or arrange for rites and sacraments for military
personnel . . . according to the respective beliefs and conscientious practices
of all concerned.”102 The Army also requires chaplains to sign a Statement
of Understanding of Religious Pluralism that includes a commitment to be
“sensitive to religious pluralism” and to “provide for the free exercise of
religion by military personnel.”103
B. Legal and Regulatory Scheme
The military chaplaincy functions under a complex matrix of overlapping
law and regulations: Law of Armed Conflict, U.S. constitutional law, U.S.
statutory law, DoD and military service regulations, and respective
ecclesiastical endorsing agency religious law. Although the chaplaincy is
established by statute,104 statutes provide only a handful of required duties
for military chaplains.105 For example, the Army statute only requires Army
chaplains to “hold appropriate religious services at least once on each
Sunday” for members of their unit and perform “burial services” for
members of their unit who die.106 Due to this lack of statutory direction, the
controlling legal authority for military chaplains is overwhelmingly based
100. STUDY OF REPRESENTATION OF RELIGIOUS FAITHS IN THE ARMED FORCES, at I-7 (U.S.
Dep’t of Defense, Jan. 1987).
101. Id.
102. 32 C.F.R. § 510.1 (2013).
103. U.S. Dep’t of Army, Office of the Chief of Chaplains, Form No. 13: Statement of
Understanding of Religious Pluralism in the U.S. Army (undated) (copy on file with the
author).
104. 10 U.S.C. § 3073 (2012) (“There are chaplains in the Army.”); 10 U.S.C. § 510
(2012) (establishing the Chaplain Corps of the Navy); 10 U.S.C. § 8067(h) (2012)
(establishing Air Force chaplains).
105. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 3547 (2012) (Army chaplains); 10 U.S.C. § 8547 (2012) (Air
Force chaplains); 10 U.S.C. § 6031 (2012) (Navy chaplains).
106. 10 U.S.C. § 3547.
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on DoD and military department regulations,107 with the majority of
regulations established by each individual military department.108
C. Chaplain Qualification Requirements
Becoming a military chaplain is no simple task. To serve as a military
chaplain, candidates must meet department-specific physical fitness and
health requirements, possess a baccalaureate degree and a graduate degree
(in religion), have two years of experience in religious ministry, obtain an
endorsement by an Armed Forces Chaplain Board-approved ecclesiastical
endorsing agency, and be willing to minister “in a pluralistic environment”
by supporting directly and indirectly the free exercise of religion by all
service members.109 The ecclesiastical endorsement certifies that the
chaplain candidate is qualified to minister to that faith group.110 If the
endorsing agency withdraws its certification, the chaplain must either seek
an endorsement from another approved agency, transfer to another branch
within the military for which he or she is qualified, or be discharged from
the military.111
D. Providing for Free Exercise Rights in the Military
As an initial matter, DoD regulations establish a general preference for
accommodating a service member’s religious practices.112 Consistent with
this general preference to accommodate, regulations require military
commanders to support the free exercise rights of their service members,113
and statute requires them to furnish facilities and transportation resources to
enable chaplains to facilitate religious accommodation.114 Indeed, the
107. See, e.g., AR 165-1, supra note 87, at para. 1-7(c) (“The duties of Chaplains beyond
those specifically mandated by statute are derived duties assigned by the Army.”).
108. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF NAVY, SEC’Y OF THE NAVY INSTR. 1730.8A,
ACCOMMODATION OF RELIGIOUS PRACTICES (Dec. 31, 1997).
109. DODI 1304.28, supra note 89, at para. 6.1-6.1.4.
110. Id. at para. 6.1.1.
111. Id. at para. 6.5.
112. DODI 1300.17, supra note 89, at 2 (“The Department of Defense places a high value
on the rights of members of the Military Services to observe the tenets of their respective
religions. It is DoD policy that requests for accommodation of religious practices should be
approved by commanders when accommodation will not have an adverse impact on mission
accomplishment, military readiness, unit cohesion, standards, or discipline.”).
113. See, e.g., AR 165-1, supra note 87, at para. 2-1a (“Commanders will provide
opportunities for the free exercise of religion through their . . . religious support members.”).
114. 10 U.S.C. § 3547(b) (2012) (“Each commanding officer shall furnish facilities,
including necessary transportation, to any chaplain assigned to his command, to assist the
chaplain in performing his duties.”).
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existence of the chaplaincy itself is an indication of the degree to which the
military seeks to accommodate that right.
But that preference to accommodate can be overridden when required by
military necessity.115 Military commanders, not chaplains or lawyers, are
the decision-makers for determining whether to accommodate a free
exercise request.116 Accommodation decisions are made on a case-by-case
basis by unit commanders after evaluating five factors:
(a) the importance of military requirements in terms of mission
accomplishment, military readiness, unit cohesion, standards,
and discipline[;] (b) [t]he religious importance of the
accommodation to the requester[;] (c) [t]he cumulative impact of
repeated accommodations of a similar nature[;] (d) [a]lternative
means available to meet the requested accommodation[; and] (e)
[p]revious treatment of the same or similar requests, including
treatment of similar requests made for reasons other than
religious ones.117
The Army, for example, allows a unit commander to deny an
accommodation request118 but only when the “accommodation will have an
adverse impact on unit readiness, individual readiness, unit cohesion,
morale, discipline, safety, and/or health.”119 Given the five-factor analysis
required in DoD regulations and the components of military necessity that
are articulated in Army regulations, an Army unit commander’s role is to
balance the individual’s religious request against concerns for the military
unit, but with a presumption that the individual should be accommodated.
In so doing, Army unit commanders must examine that request against
military necessity, and consequently, an accommodation is not
guaranteed.120
In this light, the fundamental role of the military chaplain, as set forth in
DoD regulations and military department regulations, is to assist the unit
commander in meeting the free exercise requests of service members.121

115. DODI 1300.17, supra note 89, at 4.
116. See U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 600-20, ARMY COMMAND POLICY, para. 5-6f (11
Feb. 2009) [hereinafter AR 600-20].
117. DODI 1300.17, supra note 89, at 1.
118. AR 600-20, supra note 116, at para. 5-6f.
119. Id. at para 5-6a.
120. Id.
121. DODD 1304.19, supra note 89, at para. 4; AFPD 52-1, supra note 87, at para. 3.4.1;
AR 165-1, supra note 87, at para. 4.5; SECNAV 1730.7B, supra note 87, at para. 5.
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Chaplains do so either by performing religious services (according to the
tenets of the chaplain’s faith) or by providing religious services through
coordination with other clergy to support the service member’s faith. The
Army goes one step further and conceptualizes the goal of the chaplains as
nurturing the living, caring for the wounded, and honoring the dead.122 In
practice, chaplains may also perform other roles, including social services
provider and Religious Leader Liaison.123 While these practices may raise
separate constitutional concerns, such issues are beyond the scope of this
article.
IV. Facial Challenges
A. Introduction
The military chaplaincy is perhaps the clearest example of a positive
government accommodation—or, from another perspective, an
“establishment”—of religion, as the military provides government-funded
religious support and clergy. Despite this fact and the reality that the
chaplaincy likely fails most Establishment Clause tests, it is unlikely that a
facial challenge to the program will prevail. Given the consistent favorable
citing of the military chaplaincy in past124 and more recent125 Supreme
Court dicta, the special circumstances of the military, the reality that service
members may face a heavy government-imposed burden on their free
exercise rights, and the lack of a viable alternative to the military
chaplaincy,126 it is simply unlikely that a court will strike down the
chaplaincy. Indeed, one legal commentator observing court approval of
government-sponsored prison chaplaincies, military chaplaincies, and
hospital chaplaincies, noted the courts’ consistent determinations that “state
122. Oscar T. Arauco, A Chaplain’s Preparation for Combat: A Primer on How to
Prepare for Combat Ministry 13-14 (June 17, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA436460.
123. The author has had personal experience witnessing these other roles. The Religious
Leader Engagement Operation (RLEO), also known as Religious Leader Liaison (RLL), is a
non-doctrinal concept emerging from the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. RLEO involves
U.S. military chaplains engaging local, foreign religious leaders to further U.S. military
efforts. See also STEVEN A. SCHAICK, EXAMINING THE ROLE OF CHAPLAINS AS
NONCOMBATANTS WHILE INVOLVED IN RELIGIOUS LEADER ENGAGEMENT/LIAISON 15-21
(2009), available at http:// www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA539854.
124. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 296 (1963)
(Brennan, J., concurring).
125. E.g., Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 722 (2005).
126. Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223, 232 (2d Cir. 1985).
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actors may provide religious aid to accommodate government-imposed
burdens on the free exercise of religion,” regardless of the test applied.127
He further noted that “[t]he consistency of these results is significant,
considering the unpredictability of Establishment Clause jurisprudence.”128
B. The Application of the Establishment Clause Tests
1. Lemon Test
As in Katcoff,129 a court will likely find that the military chaplaincy fails
the Lemon Test. In fact, the Lemon Test’s objective of preventing
“sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in
religious activity,”130 is squarely at odds with government institutions like
the military chaplaincy.
a) Lemon’s First Prong: Secular Purpose
The government could easily meet the first prong of the Lemon Test131
because the military chaplaincy has a primary secular purpose. Providing
for a service member’s spiritual welfare is necessary to ensure that service
members are prepared to fight and win the nation’s wars, a wholly secular
task. The chaplaincy is necessary to ensure the spiritual welfare and morale
of service members whose isolation, due to military service, may prevent
normal opportunities for religious services. To put it another way, the
secular need to have service members who are prepared to fight and—if
necessary—die in combat creates the secular purpose of the chaplaincy: to
provide clergy who aid those service members with that preparation.
Although, as the Katcoff court noted, the “immediate purpose is to promote
religion by making it available, albeit on a voluntary basis, to our armed
forces,”132 the primary purpose is secular, and the military chaplaincy meets
the requirements of the secular-purpose prong.133

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Roberts, supra note 86, at 75.
Id.
Katcoff, 755 F.2d at 236.
Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y.C., 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1969).
The elements of the Lemon test are described at supra Part II.A.1.
Katcoff, 755 F.2d at 232.
McCreary Cnty., Ky. V. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 863-64 (2005).
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b) Lemon’s Second Prong: Primary Effect
While the chaplaincy passes the secular purpose prong, there is some
basis to conclude that it fails the primary-effect prong. Indeed, the Katcoff
court held just that and found that the primary effect of the military
chaplaincy was to “advance the practice of religion.”134 However, some
legal commentators have noted that there is a substantive difference
between a “religious purpose” and a “purpose of accommodating religious
beliefs;” the latter of these purposes may be characterized not as an effort to
promote religion but, instead, as “secular respect” for religion.135 And the
government would have at least an argument that the primary effect of
chaplaincy’s “secular” purpose is to ensure that service members who face
the rigors of very secular combat are as spiritually prepared as possible.
c) Lemon’s Third Prong: Excessive Entanglement
Of the three Lemon prongs, the chaplaincy is most likely to fail the third.
The Katcoff court found that the military’s connection with ecclesiastical
endorsing agencies was an excessive entanglement of government and
religion.136 In what may be a unique case in government service, the
chaplaincy allows a religious organization to determine the prerequisites for
potential chaplains’ service—and those chaplains may be discharged if
those private religious organizations withdraw their support.137 But unlike
any other religious organization, a military commander writes a chaplain’s
evaluation, affecting the chaplain’s potential for promotion, and the military
assigns chaplains to serve in specific locations and requires those chaplains
to provide religious services to a “pluralistic” society.138 There is some
significant entanglement here. And thus, a court would likely find that the
military chaplaincy fails the third prong of the Lemon Test.
The Lemon Test is a conjunctive test. The chaplaincy’s failure to satisfy
the third prong ultimately causes it to fail the test altogether.
134. Katcoff, 755 F.2d at 232.
135. Jonathan E. Nuechterlein, The Free Exercise Boundaries of Permissible
Accommodation Under the Establishment Clause, 99 YALE L.J. 1127, 1135-36 (1990).
136. Katcoff, 755 F.2d at 232.
137. U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 600-8-24, OFFICER TRANSFERS AND DISCHARGES para. 55 (Sept. 13, 2011).
138. Under the Army’s evaluation system, a rater is typically the supervisor of the
officer, and the senior rater is typically that rater’s supervisor. For a battalion chaplain, the
rater is normally the Battalion’s Executive Officer and the senior rater is the Battalion’s
Commander. A supervisory chaplain is sometimes the intermediate rater when possible.
See U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 623-3, EVALUATION REPORTING SYSTEM (June 5, 2012).
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2. Endorsement
On the other hand, a court might or might not find that the chaplaincy
fails the Endorsement Test. One could conceivably view the nearly 4,000
military clergy and the outlay of public monies to fund them as an
endorsement of religion.139 And one might even regard the military
chaplaincy as an endorsement of a specific religion—Christianity—as
roughly 90% of military chaplains are Christians.140 As a consequence, the
approximately one-third of military members who may have no religious
preference 141 might view themselves as “outsiders, not full members of the
political community,”142 especially in light of the depth of government
involvement in providing religious accommodation to Christian service
members. But the author of the Endorsement Test, Justice O’Connor, has
noted that
one can plausibly assert that government pursues Free Exercise
Clause values when it lifts a government-imposed burden on the
free exercise of religion. . . . [T]he Court should simply
acknowledge that the religious purpose of such a [statute,
program, or policy] is legitimated by the Free Exercise Clause. . .
. [C]ourts should assume that the “objective observer” is
acquainted with the Free Exercise Clause and the values it
promotes.143
Given this idealized objective observer—who is also presumably
familiar with the fact that the chaplaincy predates the First Amendment in
American history—the chaplaincy may well survive Endorsement Test
scrutiny.
3. Coercion
A court will likely find that the military chaplaincy—as a means of
accommodating free exercise rights—satisfies the Coercion Test. Because
139. James Dao, Atheists Seek Chaplain Role in the Military, N. Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2011,
at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/27/us/27atheists.html.
140. Id.
141. Riley, supra note 98, at 14.
142. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
143. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 83 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citation
omitted). Indeed, the Wallace court was evaluating an Alabama statute that accorded a oneminute moment of silence for meditation or “prayer”—presumably lifting the burden of
voluntary school prayer during state-mandated time in school by providing for a period for
that prayer to occur.
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seeking out the assistance, advice, or religious services of military chaplains
is voluntary, a court could find that the military chaplaincy does “not coerce
anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise.”144 After all,
[t]he hallmark of accommodation is that the individual or group
decides for itself whether to engage in a religious practice, or
what practice to engage in, on grounds independent of the
governmental action.
The government simply facilitates
(“accommodates”) the decision of the individual or group; it
does not induce or direct, by means of either incentives or
compulsion.145
But service members are sometimes compelled to attend events at which
invocations are offered, and this mandatory attendance at or obligatory
participation in programs in which clergy may be involved—including
social-welfare programs and invocations at official military events—may
run afoul of the Coercion Test.146 Still DoD and military department
regulations state that the fundamental role of a military chaplain is to assist
the unit commander in meeting the free exercise requests of service
members.147 Service members’ involvement with military chaplains in this
capacity is strictly voluntary, and this capacity would likely survive the
Coercion Test.
4. Neutrality Test
Finally, a Court would find that the military chaplaincy violates the
Neutrality Test. The government funding of clergy, religious buildings, and
religious materials—all provisions explicitly tied to the accommodation of
service members’ free exercise rights—clearly is based on a consideration
of religion and is not a neutral action.

144. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 581 (1992).
145. Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to
the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685, 688 (1992).
146. Notably, however, the Court has indicated that the Coercion Test may be limited to
primary school contexts. See, e.g., Weisman, 505 U.S. at 593, in which the court declined to
address whether religious activity would be compelled “if the affected citizens [were] mature
adults,” but noted that “the State may not, consistent with the Establishment Clause, place
primary and secondary school children in this position.” The Supreme Court has yet to
address the issue of public prayer in the military context.
147. DODD 1304.19, supra note 89, at para. 4.1.
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5. Results of This Application
Given the inconsistent use of traditional Establishment Clause tests and
the Court’s historic tendency to support the constitutionality of the
chaplaincy, it is unlikely that any traditional Establishment Clause
analysis—taken alone—would be outcome-determinative in new military
chaplaincy litigation. Indeed, as in Katcoff, a court is likely to consider
whether other factors are enough to override the Establishment Clause.
C. Free Exercise Analysis
In Cutter v. Wilkinson, the Supreme Court quoted approvingly, albeit in
dicta, of the Second Circuit’s Katcoff opinion.148 The Cutter Court upheld a
federal law that imposed strict scrutiny on government actions that
burdened an inmate’s religious exercise rights.149 The Court held that the
Establishment Clause allows the government to accommodate religious
needs: (1) in order to “alleviate[] exceptional government-created burdens
on private religious exercise,”150 (2) when nonbeneficiaries of the program
are not unduly burdened, and (3) when the accommodation is administered
neutrally to other religions.151 One law professor noted that the Court’s
actions were novel, elevating the requirements of the Free Exercise Clause
beyond what had been allowed under previous Establishment Clause
precedent: “[T]he Free Exercise Clause [now] shapes the meaning of the
Establishment Clause. It makes constitutional statutes that otherwise would
be unconstitutional.”152 Notably in a case about the rights of inmates, the
148. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 722 (2005).
149. Id. at 721. Prior to enacting the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act (RLUIPA), Congress held three years of hearings documenting barriers to religious
exercise for institutionalized religious persons. Id. at 716. RLUIPA is one of Congress's
efforts to provide additional protection for religious exercise following the Supreme Court's
Smith decision, which held that the Free Exercise Clause is not violated by enforcement of
general, neutral laws that incidentally burden religious conduct. See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of
Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (holding that the Free Exercise
Clause did not bar Oregon from enforcing drug laws against Native Americans' religious use
of peyote), superseded by statute, Religious Land Use & Institutionalized Persons Act of
2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803, as recognized in Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S. Ct.
1651 (2011). Following Smith, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1993, which imposed strict scrutiny on all federal and state law and was held
unconstitutional as applied to state and local governments in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
150. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 720.
151. Id. at 722 (citing with approval Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1985)).
152. Goldberg, supra note 70, at 1410.
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Court reached this holding despite the strong opposition of correctional
officials, “a group to which it typically defers.”153
In addition to the obvious importance of the Supreme Court’s favorable
citing of Katcoff, the facts in Cutter are roughly analogous to those in
Katcoff. Despite qualitative differences between service members and
inmates, like inmates, service members can have “exceptional governmentcreated burdens on private religious exercise,” as when deployed to a
combat zone, a rural military base in the United States, or an internationally
located American military base.154 Therefore, service members may be
severely hampered when it comes to accessing civilian religious resources.
Additionally service members are compelled to follow lawful government
movement orders, under threat of criminal sanctions in the Uniform Code
of Military Justice;155 similarly, prisoners are required to follow all lawful
orders from correctional officers.156 And because of government-imposed
restrictions, both groups cannot leave their assigned locations to find their
own religious services. As a result, in both Katcoff and Cutter,
notwithstanding any Establishment Clause concerns, the courts held that the
respective chaplaincies were necessary to provide for the free exercise
rights of those respective groups.
But Cutter did not answer the as-applied issue left open in Katcoff—
whether the chaplaincy was constitutional in an area in which there was no
impediment to the access of religious services. To be sure, in Cutter, the
Supreme Court seemingly provided the Free Exercise Clause a “‘preferred
position’ in our constitutional order,”157 especially in conflicts with the
Establishment Clause.158 And the Katcoff court found that the military
chaplaincy was not only permitted but constitutionally required to protect
the free exercise rights of Army soldiers: “Unless the Army provided a
chaplaincy it would deprive the soldier of . . . his right under the Free
Exercise Clause to practice his freely chosen religion.”159 But neither
153. Id. at 1404.
154. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 720.
155. See 10 U.S.C. § 887 (2012).
156. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1) (2012) (discussing good-conduct time for exemplary
behavior).
157. Goldberg, supra note 70, at 1416, 1418 (citations omitted).
158. TRIBE, supra note 71, at 1201 (“[T]he free exercise principle should be dominant
when it conflicts with the anti-establishment principle. Such dominance is the natural result
of tolerating religion as broadly as possible rather than thwarting at all costs even the faintest
appearance of establishment.”).
159. Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223, 234 (2d Cir. 1985). But see Larsen v. U.S. Navy,
486 F. Supp. 2d 11, 31-33 (D.D.C. 2007) (ruling that military chaplaincy program is not a
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holding of facial constitutionality purports to resolve the issue left open in
the Katcoff remand.
D. Katcoff Test
To resolve the contradiction between the Establishment Clause and Free
Exercise Clause, Katcoff developed a novel test based largely on the War
Powers Clause160 and on the perceived judicial reluctance to impose a
decision that might impact military discipline.161 To determine the
constitutionality of the Army chaplaincy, the test asks “whether, after
considering practical alternatives, the chaplaincy program is relevant to and
reasonably necessary for the Army's conduct of our national defense.”162
Given the deference the Supreme Court has given military policies that
impact military readiness,163 it is unlikely that a court would deem any
alternative religious support model superior to the current military
chaplaincy unless proven by a high evidentiary standard, possibly even
“clear and convincing” evidence. And this fact means that it is likely that
the chaplaincy would survive another facial constitutional challenge.
As an initial matter, it is relevant that the factual basis of the Katcoff
holding has eroded with time. First, the argument that civilian clergy
cannot effectively minister to service members has been undercut by the use
of non-personal service (NPS) contracts with civilian clergy in “critically
short faith groups.”164 NPS civilian clergy must be “fully ordained or
mandatory accommodation of service members' free exercise rights but a permissive
accommodation of service members' free exercise interests).
160. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 11. As one legal commentator noted, Goldman v.
Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986), acted effectively to delegate questions of religious
freedom in the military to the legislative and executive branches, discouraging the courts
from intervening. Michael F. Noone, Rendering Unto Caesar: Legal Responses to Religious
Nonconformity in the Armed Forces, 18 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1233, 1261 (1987).
161. Warren, supra note 75, at 186-87.
162. Katcoff, 755 F.2d at 234, 235 (“[C]aution dictates that when a matter provided for
by Congress in the exercise of its war power and implemented by the Army appears
reasonably relevant and necessary to furtherance of our national defense it should be treated
as presumptively valid and any doubt as to its constitutionality should be resolved as a
matter of judicial comity in favor of deference to the military's exercise of its discretion.”).
163. See id.
164. Donald G. Hanchett, Resourcing the Religious Mission of the Army to the Year
2000 and Beyond: Significant Concerns and Issues 22 (Apr. 15, 1993) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA264236 (“In recent years the
Army has found it necessary to contract the services of clergy who represent critically short
faith groups in the Army. This has primarily been necessary to provide religious coverage to
Catholic soldiers and family members, since the Army has less than 40% of the number of
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accredited” by a DoD-approved ecclesiastical endorsing agency but
otherwise do not have to meet the requirements for military chaplains (i.e.,
physical and health fitness, a graduate degree, and two years of religious
ministry experience).165 NPS civilian clergy are not in uniform and do not
hold military rank, but they provide the same religious support to service
members on military bases as their military chaplain peers.166 And with the
expansion of military jurisdiction over civilians who accompany the force
during contingency operations—i.e., Afghanistan or Iraq—they may even
be subject to military discipline.167
Second, the “embedding” of civilian journalists in Operation Iraqi
Freedom undercuts the notion in Katcoff that civilian clergy are incapable
of safely accompanying the U.S. military on a modern battlefield. To
prepare the embeds for war in Iraq, the Pentagon devised a one-week
“media boot camp,” which eventually trained over 500 reporters and
photographers in navigation, tactical marching, and combat first aid.168 The
training was designed to ensure that reporters would not “be a burden to the
units” to which they were attached.169 The success of the embed program
offers a model for civilian clergy to successfully and safely integrate with
military units in major combat operations.
But despite this slow erosion of the factual basis in Katcoff, the military
chaplaincy likely remains the only viable method to provide consistent and
reliable religious support to the military. There is no evidence that religious
organizations would consistently send their clergy to embed in American
units. Secondly, there is no evidence that religious organizations could
deploy on short notice to provide such religious support, as military
chaplains can. Indeed, even the closest modern-day equivalent to Katcoff’s
and Wieder’s civilian-clergy corps (the NPS-contracted civilian clergy)

Catholic Chaplains it requires to meet the Army’s need. The contract instrument used to
contract Catholic Priests is the Nonpersonal Services contract.”).
165. The Army, for one, does not require contracted civilian clergy to have a graduate
degree, just to be “fully ordained or accredited” by a DoD recognized ecclesiastical
endorsing agency. AR 165-1, supra note 87, at para. 5-3(g).
166. Id. at para. 5-3(c) to 5-3(e).
167. See 10 U.S.C. 802(a)(10) (2012) (subjecting civilians who accompany the force to
the Uniform Code in a contingency operation). But see 18 U.S.C. § 212 (2012) (extending
the U.S. Code to the overseas actions of, inter alia, U.S. government contractors in some
circumstances).
168. Andrew Jacobs, My Week at Embed Boot Camp, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2003, at
SM34.
169. Id.
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remain home when service members deploy overseas. Thus, at this point in
time, only a military chaplaincy can satisfy the Katcoff test.
V. Overbroad Accommodation?
Assuming the continuing validity of the Katcoff test, the existence of the
military chaplaincy is permissible—and perhaps even constitutionally
required—to facilitate the free exercise rights of those service members
who lack access to religious resources due to burdens imposed by their
military service. As Katcoff pointed out, however, such burdens may not
exist for the entire military community.170 In Carter v. Broadlawns Medical
Center, the Eighth Circuit made the same observations with respect to the
Veterans Affairs’ hospital chaplaincy. 171 The court stated that the hospital
chaplaincy was a “permissible accommodation of at least some patients’
free exercise rights” because “[t]here was evidence that a large percentage
of [the hospital’s] patients were subject to restrictions on their movement
attributable to the state by virtue of the fact that [they] were prisoners or
had been involuntarily committed or by virtue of hospital rules in the
psychiatric ward.”172 Because “[s]uch restrictions constitute a stateimposed burden on the patients’ religious practices,” the Eighth Circuit held
that “the state may appropriately adjust for [those restrictions].”173
This section first examines the extent to which the military chaplaincy
may provide religious support to accommodate service members’ free
exercise rights even when such service members are not subject to a
government-imposed burden on their religious practices. It concludes that
to the extent that such accommodation is unnecessary to allow service
members to exercise their free exercise rights, the accommodation is
prohibited by the Establishment Clause.
A. Evaluating the Accommodation of Free Exercise Rights
Both Religion Clauses implicate the issue of whether the government
must, may, or may not facilitate religious exercise. For the purpose of this
article, the various requirements are characterized as mandatory
accommodation,
permissible
accommodation,
and
prohibited
accommodation. Under the Free Exercise Clause, the question is whether
170. Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223, 238 (2d Cir. 1985).
171. 857 F.2d 448, 457 (8th Cir. 1988).
172. Id. (emphasis added).
173. Id. (citing Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987)).
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government accommodation of free exercise—by providing benefits or
removing
hindrances—is
constitutionally
required
(mandatory
accommodation). Under the Establishment Clause, the question is whether
such government accommodation is constitutionally permitted (permissible
accommodation) but not forbidden (prohibited accommodation).
1. Mandatory Accommodation
The Free Exercise Clause “affirmatively mandates accommodation, not
merely tolerance” of religious practices to the extent that government
practices or policies substantially burden religious free exercise without a
compelling governmental interest.174
Such accommodation may be
required even though it may have the perceived effect of advancing
religion.175 This type of accommodation is at the heart of the Katcoff
decision.
2. Permissible Accommodation
There is considerable uncertainty as to the outer limits of permissible
accommodation under the Establishment Clause. Justice Brennan has
explicitly stated that the Court “in no way [suggests] that all benefits
conferred exclusively upon religious groups or upon individuals on account
of their religious beliefs are forbidden by the Establishment Clause unless
they are mandated by the Free Exercise Clause.”176 Thus, while the
Supreme Court has indicated that the government has some latitude to
accommodate religion beyond the requirements of the Free Exercise
Clause, it has not clarified the relationship between permissible and
mandatory accommodations.
The Court has noted that the Constitution allows “‘benevolent neutrality
which will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and
without interference’”177 but also has acknowledged that “[a]t some point,
accommodation may devolve into ‘an unlawful fostering of religion.’”178
174. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984); see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 220 (1972).
175. See, e.g., Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005) (finding a statutory religious
accommodation constitutional on the grounds that it sought to remove substantial
government-imposed burdens on prisoners’ religious free exercise); see also Bd. of Educ. of
Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1984).
176. Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 18 n.8 (1989).
177. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop, 483 U.S. at 334 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n of
N.Y.C., 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970)).
178. Id. at 334-35 (quoting Hobbie v. Unemp’t App. Comm’n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 145
(1987)).
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The Court has declined, however, to demarcate at what point such action
becomes unconstitutional.
What can be said of these conflicting
principles—the product of ill-defined legal tests—is only that when there is
a burden to the free exercise of religious rights, the government may
accommodate those religious practices (in some circumstances, at some
times, for some reasons) even when it is not the cause of that burden.
3. Prohibited Accommodation
The government may not specifically accommodate religion if its action
does not aim to relieve some burden on free exercise. As Justice O’Connor
stated, “[J]udicial deference to all legislation that purports to facilitate the
free exercise of religion would completely vitiate the Establishment Clause.
Any statute pertaining to religion can be viewed as an ‘accommodation’ of
free exercise rights.” 179 In another opinion, she wrote: “In order to perceive
the government action as a permissible accommodation of religion, there
must in fact be an identifiable burden on the exercise of religion that can
said to be lifted by the government action.”180 Absent some burden, the
specific accommodation of religious groups or activities impermissibly
advances religion.181
C. Specific Barriers to Free Exercise: Determining the Necessity of
Chaplain Assignments
At both the Supreme Court and circuit court levels, the justification for
military chaplains is consistently tied to service members’ restricted access
to religious services. In Schempp, Justice Brennan referred to “soldiers cut
off by the State from all civilian opportunities for public communion,”182
and dissenting Justice Stewart noted that “a lonely soldier stationed at some
faraway outpost could surely complain that a government which did not
provide him the opportunity for pastoral guidance was affirmatively
prohibiting the free exercise of his religion.”183
179. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 82 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citation
omitted).
180. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop, 483 U.S. at 348 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment).
181. See, e.g., Tex. Monthly, 489 U.S. at 17 (finding that a generally applicable tax did
not unduly burden religious publications and that a religious exemption—as opposed to a
general exemption for charities or nonprofit organizations—unconstitutionally preferred
religion to non-religion).
182. Sch. Dist. Of Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 299 (1963) (Brennan,
J., concurring).
183. Id. at 309 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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The justification of necessity, however, does not apply universally within
the military community. On the contrary, a significant number of military
units are assigned to areas where service members’ free exercise rights can
be fully satisfied by local, private clergy. This was the precise issue in
Katcoff that was remanded by the Second Circuit to the federal district court
for examination but was never litigated.184 The Second Circuit, however,
only addressed the access of service members in “large urban centers.”185
This designation is both imprecise and insufficient in attempting to
characterize the need for the accommodation of service members’ right to
free exercise; a broader perspective is needed.
In that broader view, it is clear, first, that some military units stationed in
“large urban centers” can still deploy worldwide. Thus units must be
further differentiated as either non-deployable or deployable,186 in order to
prevent service members from being “left in the lurch, religiously
speaking.”187 Indeed, during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, even
ceremonial military units, such as the Old Guard in Arlington, Virginia,
which provides an honor guard for the President, have deployed to
combat.188
Thus in order to ensure that service members have adequate opportunity
to engage in religious free exercise—and therefore meet the government’s
free exercise obligations while also respecting the Establishment Clause’s
restrictions—military chaplains must be attached to virtually all “rural”
units and to urbanized-area units that have the potential to deploy (even if
in some such units, deployment is a remote possibility). But military
chaplains should not be assigned to provide for the free exercise needs of
non-deployable units that have sufficient access to religious resources, as
there is no significant burden to these units’ religious free exercise.189

184. Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223, 237-38 (2d Cir. 1985).
185. Id. at 238.
186. A non-deployable unit is a unit that cannot be sent from its home station to another
location to perform a mission. It is basically stationary. A deployable unit, on the other
hand, can be ordered to other locations to perform its mission.
187. Katcoff, 755 F.2d at 228.
188. Robert Burns, U.S. Plans Extra Air Power in Asia While Ground Forces Focus on
Iraq, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 19, 2004, available at Westlaw, 1/19/04 HSTNCHRON A14.
189. With a military chaplain corps of almost 4,000, see Svan, supra note 13, a portion of
military chaplain assignments to non-deploying units in urban areas will still be necessary
for administrative or personnel management duties unrelated to providing for the free
exercise rights of service members.
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1. Geopolitical Characterization of Unit Locales
Making a simple urban/rural distinction is not as straightforward as one
might think. When it comes to the term “rural,” for example, there are three
federal agencies that have promulgated three very different definitions,
which are still commonly applied: the U.S. Census Bureau,190 the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB),191 and the Economic Research Service of
the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA).192 Notably, the Congress has
historically declined to define “rural” or “urban” when targeting a program
toward a particular area.193
Although what constitutes “rural” remains contested, what is urban is
reasonably well defined, and it is in these “urbanized areas” (UAs) in which
the likelihood of religious diversity—and corresponding religious
establishments—is highest. The U.S. Census Bureau defines a UA as an
area that has a core (one or more contiguous census block groups (BGs))
with a total land area of less than two square miles and a population density
of 1,000 persons per square mile; UAs may contain adjoining territory with
a minimum of 500 persons per square mile and must encompass a
population of at least 50,000 people.194 These are population-dense
locations, also known as cities.
There are a number of military installations that are in locations where
these UAs may be accessed. In his thesis analyzing the Navy chaplain
corps, for instance, one Naval officer stated, “Most [non-deployable] shore
billets are in populated areas with sufficient civilian religious resources

190. In 2010, the Census Bureau used the helpful “not urban” definition for rural. 2010
Census Urban and Rural Classification and Urban Area Criteria, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/geo/reference/ua/urban-rural-2010.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2013).
191. In 2010, the OMB gave up the ghost, if you will, and decided no longer to try and
define rural, although it implies a definition of rural by excluding some portion of the
country from the Metropolitan and Micropolitan Statistical Areas. 2010 Standards for
Delineating Metropolitan and Micropolitan Statistical Areas Notice, 75 Fed. Reg. 32746
(June 28, 2010).
192. Rural Classifications, U.S.D.A., http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/rural-economy-pop
ulation/rural-classifications/data-for-rural-analysis.aspx (last visited July 30, 2013).
193. Although the Senate’s version of the 2013 farm bill may change that, at this point,
the Federal Government has at least fifteen definitions of rural but none of those definitions
have been enacted by the Congress. The Federal Definition of ‘Rural’ —Times 15, WASH.
POST (June 8, 2013), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-06-08/politics/39832812_
1_rural-area-agriculture-department-population.
194. Urban Criteria for Census 2000, 67 Fed. Reg. 11,663, 11,667 (Mar. 15, 2002).
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within a reasonable distance.”195 Washington, D.C., for example, has
sufficient local, private religious groups to meet the free exercise rights of
service members who are assigned to the Pentagon and surrounding
military installations without deployable units. Indeed, the religious
diversity in the greater Washington, D.C. area (including the Pentagon) is
broad; one ten-mile stretch of road in Montgomery County, Maryland, is
referred to as the “Highway to Heaven” and includes twenty-nine Christian
and twenty-one Protestant churches, a Buddhist temple, a Hindu Temple,
and a Jewish synagogue.196 There are at least twenty-four major American
cities, ranging from Dallas to Detroit, that can be characterized as UAs and
have nearby military bases.197
Assigning military chaplains to provide for the free exercise rights of
service members in highly dense population areas relieves no governmentimposed burden on religious free exercise, and the need for military
chaplains on these bases should be reevaluated. In contrast, this religious
diversity found in UAs is least likely to be found in “rural” areas—however
that term is defined.198 Consequently, units that are assigned to these more
remote areas may not have sufficient access to religious resources to meet
those service members’ free exercise rights.
Of course, those installations in areas with characteristics between the
urban and rural classifications pose the most difficult problems. These
areas of moderate population density are characterized as Urban Clusters
195. Kenneth G. Harris, Restructuring the United States Navy Chaplain Corps 8 (Sep.
2005) (unpublished manuscript) available at http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA439298).
196. Susan Levine, A Place for Prayer, WASH. POST (Aug. 3, 1997), http://www. washing
tonpost.com/wp-srv/local/longterm/library/churches/prayer97.htm. A ten-mile stretch of New
Hampshire Avenue in Montgomery County, Maryland includes a synagogue, a mosque, a
Cambodian Buddhist temple, a Hindu temple, a Unitarian church, and twenty-nine Christian
churches, including three Catholic, one Ukrainian Orthodox, two Seventh Day Adventist, two
Jehovah’s Witness Kingdom Halls, and twenty-one Protestant churches. Id. The Protestants
range from Presbyterian, United Methodist, and Lutheran to a large and growing
nondenominational Bible church. Id.
197. There are currently military bases near the following major U.S. cities: Seattle,
Washington; Los Angeles, California; San Diego, California; Las Vegas, Nevada; Colorado
Springs, Colorado; San Antonio, Texas; Dallas, Texas; Corpus Christi, Texas; Kansas City,
Missouri; Chicago, Illinois; New Orleans, Louisiana; Tampa, Florida; Miami, Florida;
Jacksonville, Florida; Atlanta, Georgia; Detroit, Michigan; Cleveland, Ohio; Norfolk,
Virginia; Columbia, South Carolina; Washington, D.C.; New York, New York; Providence,
Rhode Island; Anchorage, Alaska; and Honolulu, Hawaii. See 2007 GUIDE TO MILITARY
INSTALLATIONS WORLDWIDE (David B. Craig ed., 2006).
198. For official definitions of rural and urban, see supra notes 191-195 and
accompanying text.
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(UCs).199 Like a UA, a UC has a core identified with a total land area of
less than two square miles and a population density of 1,000 persons per
square mile.200 But although a UC may also contain adjoining territory
with, at minimum, 500 persons per square mile, it may encompass a
population of only 2,500 to 50,000 persons.201 Because of the broad range
of population density within a UC, it would be difficult to determine
whether or not a military unit located within or near a UC would have
sufficient access to a plurality of religious establishments.
The best approach in this situation is a case-by-case one, and deference is
owed to any corresponding military decision. Multiple models are
available to the DoD in determining the sufficiency of service member
access to local, private religious coverage. One model that could be used, at
least within the United States, is the current DoD process of surveying
civilian areas adjacent to military bases in order to determine the military’s
housing allowance benefit (Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH)) to service
members. DoD contracts for an annual survey of more than 350 military
housing areas across the United States, examining six different housing
profiles.202 The military could use a similar U.S. base survey or expand the
current BAH contract’s scope of work to evaluate the distribution and
diversity of religious establishments and institutions around military bases.
Even so, the process of determining religious diversity is not as simple as
counting churches, temples, and mosques, which the U.S. Census Bureau
discovered in 1936.203 The bureau first began collecting data on religion in
1850, when “census supervisors collected data on the seating capacity,
value, and denomination of churches for every county in the United
States.”204 These religious censuses were regarded as highly reliable until
1936 when the Bureau of the Census acknowledged serious deficiencies in
that year’s report.205 The Census Bureau discovered that
[w]ith several groups in the South and West refusing to
participate . . . the 1936 religious census was a bitter
199.
200.
201.
202.

67 Fed. Reg. at 11,667.
Id.
Id.
Rudi Williams, DoD Slicing Out-of-Pocket Housing Costs Starting Jan. 1, AM.
FORCES PRESS SERV. (Dec. 19, 2002), http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?
ID=42373.
203. See Roger Finke & Christopher Scheitle, Accounting for the Uncounted: Computing
Correctives for the 2000 RCMS Data, 47 REV. RELIGIOUS RES. 5, 6 (2005).
204. Id. at 21 n.2.
205. Id. at 6.
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disappointment . . . . But if the 1936 census was a
disappointment, the 1946 religious census was a complete
failure. Facing stiff resistance from religious groups challenging
its propriety, the effort was completely abandoned when
Congress denied funding for the latter [sic] phases of the
project.206
Since that time, multiple private organizations—including the Yearbook
of American and Canadian Churches, National Council of Churches,
Glenmary Research Center, and Association of Statisticians of American
Religious Bodies—have attempted to offer alternatives to the government
sponsored censuses.207 But a lack of full religious and denominational
participation, inconsistent undercounting across regions, and lack of
specific local (or even regional) data, has limited confidence in the accuracy
and utility of these organization’s collected data.208
These participation problems, however, may not pose as great of a
barrier to the military as they did to earlier efforts. The military, of course,
likely has considerably more resources and experience in data collection
and analysis than small private organizations do today or the U.S. Census
Bureau did seventy-five years ago. Furthermore, religious organizations
may be more amenable to cooperating in a survey designed to ensure
religious free exercise and minimize unnecessary government involvement
in religious affairs, especially if the continued constitutional viability of the
chaplaincy rested, in part, on these efforts.
Assuming that it can obtain sufficient data on the distribution of religious
places of worship, the DoD is more than capable of establishing metrics to
determine the feasibility of service member access to those religious
services—and thereby the necessity of assigning chaplains to those
locations. One such measure could be to determine what constitutes an
adequate diversity of religious services and acceptable commutes to those
services. In many ways, the military already does this in other areas. For
example, Tricare, the military’s healthcare benefit program, has established
policies dictating the maximum time and distance that beneficiaries may be
required to travel in order to receive care; the Tricare manual states
specifically that a beneficiary’s primary care manager’s (PCM) “office

206. Id.
207. Id.
208. See id.
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[should be] within 30 minutes of [the patient’s] home under normal
circumstances.”209
The consolidation of data and determination of policies discussed thus
far would allow DoD administrators—or even military chaplains—to
determine whether to assign additional chaplains to non-deploying units
based in UCs. At many bases, this kind of coordination between military
chaplains and local clergy is already occurring.210 In fact, the Air Force
regularly works with local Catholic churches to provide for Roman Catholic
Airmen.211 In short, the military is more than capable of ensuring that free
exercise accommodations are adequate for service members assigned to a
given geopolitical area.
2. Foreign-Based Units
Service members may also encounter challenges to their religious
practices when based in foreign countries; internationally based service
members may encounter language barriers (as in Germany or Korea), offbase restrictions (as in Korea), or other obstacles to free exercise.212 In
short, like rural-based units, internationally based units are highly likely to
have need of military chaplains to ensure that service members have
sufficient opportunities to freely exercise their religions.
3. Deployable and Non-Deployable Units
Service members invariably have little to no access to religious resources
when they are deployed. Recognizing this fact, several military chaplains
have, in essence, acknowledged that an assignment to deployable units is
This
perhaps the critical function of the military chaplaincy.213
209. HUMANA MILITARY HEALTHCARE SERVS., TRICARE PRIME AND TRICARE PRIME
REMOTE HANDBOOK: YOUR GUIDE TO PROGRAM BENEFITS 14 (Nov. 2012), available at
http://www.tricare.mil/~/media/Files/TRICARE/Publications/Handbooks/TP_TPR_HBK.pdf.
210. Press Release, Air Combat Command, AIR COMBAT COMMAND CHAPLAIN
EMPHASIZES AIRMEN’S RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (Sept. 3, 2009), available at
http://www.1af.acc.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123166352 (“We now work with Catholic
churches in local communities around Air Force bases to help meet this [lack of Roman
Catholic chaplains to cover Roman Catholic Airmen’ religious needs].”).
211. Id.
212. Jon Rabirof, Military Curfew in South Korea to Continue, STARS & STRIPES (Jan.
17, 2013), http://www.military.com/daily-news/2013/01/17/military-curfew-in-south-koreato-continue.html.
213. Jerome A. Haberek, The Chaplaincy in the Army After Next 3, 10-11, 23 (Apr. 6,
1998) (unpublished manuscript) available at http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA341458
(“While force structure might dictate changes in numbers, and positions where chaplains
serve, chaplains must remain in TO&E [deployable] organizations. . . . A chaplain will be
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acknowledgement implicitly recognizes that military chaplain assignments
to non-deployable units are, at the very least, less critical.214 Determining
which military units are deployable requires a separate analysis for each
military department—Army, Navy, and Air Force—as each organizes for
and fights in a war differently. Consequently, each military chaplain corps
is organized somewhat differently, as it is designed to integrate with its
respective military department: the Air Force chaplain corps is assigned to
air bases, the Navy chaplain corps is assigned to either ship, shore, or other
service billets, and the Army is assigned to either deploying or nondeploying Army units.215 This section will analyze the Army and Navy
chaplain corps in order to determine what units are or are not deployable.
In the Army, units that deploy and fight are designated as Table of
Organization and Equipment (TOE) units, while non-fighting, nondeploying units are designated as Table of Distribution and Allowances
(TDA) units.216 Military chaplains are currently assigned to both TOE and
TDA units.217 TOE units are readily recognizable to most Americans—such
as the 4th Infantry Division, 82nd Airborne Division, or 101st Air Assault
Division; TDA units, on the other hand, are not as recognizable and are
assigned mainly to “fixed facilities, command and control headquarters, and
other Army/Joint organizations.”218 A significant percentage of Army
chaplains are assigned to these TDA units; at the installation level in 1993,
20%-30% of Army chaplain billets were in TDA positions.219
needed to share the hardships of troops and provide comfort to those in need, both physically
and emotionally. Soldiers need to know that their religious leader is willing to undergo the
hardships and suffering that they endure. Only in that context can ministry be effective. . . .
Technology is something that will support the work of the chaplain. They must utilize it, but
also remember their primary mission is the love and care of their people. This can only be
accomplished when they are physically present with the flock. Development of technology
must enhance ministry and not be a tool to replace it.”); Hanchett, supra note 164, at 17-18
(“Were it not for TOE requirements and the unique character of military society, it may be
possible to civilianize the chaplaincy.”).
214. See Haberek, supra note 214, at 10-11.
215. Dan Ames, Keeping Faith: Manning the Army Chaplain Corps During Persistent
Engagement 4 (Mar. 12, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://handle.
dtic.mil/100.2/ADA498473.
216. Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE), Table of Distribution and Allowances
(TDA), GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/toe.htm
(last visited Oct. 10, 2013) [hereinafter GLOBALSECURITY.ORG].
217. Haberek, supra note 214, at 17.
218. GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, supra note 218.
219. Hanchett, supra note 164, at 17. Of course, TDA assignments may include units,
such as Basic Training companies, that although non-deploying, may qualify for a military
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In the Navy, chaplains are assigned to ship, shore, or with other services,
such as the United States Marine Corps (Marines).220 As with Army TOE
units, a Navy chaplain assignment with the Marines is a deployable
position.221 Additionally, assignment to a U.S. Ship (USS) as a permanent
crewmember carries with that assignment the potential for long
deployments or exercises at sea.222 Therefore, assignment to a USS or the
Marines is to a deployable unit. However, a shore-based assignment does
not normally entail a deployment obligation.223 Excluding assignments to
Marine units, approximately one-third of Navy chaplains are assigned to
USS or other deployable billets, while two-thirds of Navy chaplains were
assigned to non-deployable shore billets.224
As the foregoing analysis shows, the military already does and a court
readily could determine, which units are or are not readily deployable, and
there is good cause for distinguishing between deploying and nondeploying units in considering the necessity of military chaplains. Thus,
adding a deployment element to the Katcoff analysis would not require a
fact or time-intensive analysis by courts.
D. Counter-Arguments
Reevaluating positions for military chaplains on UA and UC based
military installations is not without criticism.225 Some have speculated that
military chaplain retention rates will decrease if chaplains are assigned
primarily to rural bases;226 however, there is no publicly available study
linking the availability of urban assignments to military chaplain retention.
chaplain under this analysis due to the additional limitations that they face with respect to
access to resources off-base. There are, however, reports of local clergy ministering to basic
trainees, so whether chaplains are critical to these TDA units might be an area that a court
would need to consider more fully. Bryant Jordan, ‘God’s Basic Training’ Coming Under
Fire, MILITARY.COM (Dec. 19, 2007), http://www.military.com/NewsContent/0,13319,1585
31,00.html.
220. Note that United States Navy chaplains may also be assigned to units in the United
State Marine Corps, United States Merchant Marine, or the United States Coast Guard. A
Calling Within a Calling: Chaplain, NAVY.COM, http://www.navy.com/careers/chaplainsupport/chaplain.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2013) (“Together, Navy Chaplains enable the
free practice of religion for all the Sailors, Marines and Coast Guardsmen who serve.”).
221. Harris, supra note 196, at 5.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 7-8.
225. See Richard Rosen, Katcoff v. Marsh at Twenty-Two: The Military Chaplaincy and
the Separation of Church and States, 38 U. TOL. L. REV. 1137, 1147-48 (2007).
226. Id. at 1148.
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In fact, it is plausible that a military chaplain may prefer an assignment to a
rural area over an urban one. In any event, retention of chaplains in and of
itself is likely not a sufficient consideration to avoid an Establishment
Clause violation.
Others argue that changing the policy on chaplain placement will
undermine the performance of non-free exercise duties, including activities
such as burial services mandated by 10 U.S.C. § 3547.227 This argument,
however, overlooks the fact that a reevaluation of chaplain placement need
not eliminate the presence of military chaplains to military bases in UAs
altogether. On the contrary, the proposed limitations would only affect nondeploying units on specified urban bases insofar as they would not need
chaplains for the purpose of free exercise accommodation; chaplains could
still be assigned to non-deploying units on urban bases for other purposes.
For example, Army chaplains could continue to receive assignments to the
Pentagon to perform administrative jobs at the Army Chief of Chaplains
Office or to a D.C.-area base for the purpose of performing burial services
at Arlington National Cemetery. In sum, arguments against reshaping
military chaplain assignments to UA-based installations can be dismissed
by adding the deployment and free exercise role elements to the Katcoff
analysis.
Finally, some may argue that the rural-international-deployable
distinction for which this article advocates would be too administratively
complex for DoD to implement or for the courts to supervise. And
ultimately, if the constitutional basis for the chaplaincy is the government’s
imposition of burdens on the free exercise rights of service members, then
that need—and more importantly, that constitutional mandate—is obviated
in locations in which there is no government-imposed burden. Beyond that
constitutional reality, it also makes administrative sense to employ limited
resources in those locations where those resources are actually needed—
i.e., rural, international, and deployed locations.
VI. Proposal for a Constitutional Twenty-First-Century Chaplaincy
Court precedent at various levels consistently indicates that the military
chaplaincy is constitutional insofar as it provides free exercise opportunities
to those who otherwise would likely be deprived of access to religious
services. Indeed, because military obligations, assignments, and orders
hinder religious access for deployable units and service members in rural,
international, and perhaps even suburban (UC) based units, the Free
227. Id.
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Exercise Clause compels the government to take action to alleviate those
hindrances; the government does so by providing chaplains (and attendant
religious resources) to service members. As such, the Chaplains Corps is a
constitutional accommodation of these service members’ free exercise
rights.
The aforementioned hindrances are nonexistent for those service
members assigned to non-deployable units in UAs and may not be a
concern for service members assigned to non-deployable units in certain
UCs. In short, the DoD’s chaplaincy program is overbroad: it provides
military chaplains for the purpose of accommodating some service
members who already enjoy sufficient access to religious resources. With
respect to these service members, the military’s chaplaincy program
amounts to an impermissible advancement of religion and, as such, cannot
survive constitutional muster.
Given that the government may not constitutionally assign chaplains to
provide for the free exercise of service members who suffer no governmentimposed obstacle to the exercise of those rights, the most critical question
for the courts to address is how to determine the sufficiency of religious
access. Such questions may involve administrative, logistical, and security
considerations. On these topics, the Court has historically deferred to the
military, allowing the military to administer the Court-imposed standard.
As discussed earlier, the DoD has multiple avenues for determining the
sufficiency of religious access. The most straightforward determination
would involve a characterization of units as deployable or non-deployable
(with the attendant presumption that deployable units require military
chaplains to provide for service members’ free exercise). Among those units
that are non-deployable, the analysis may become somewhat more
complicated. Non-deployable units in urban areas of the United States
almost certainly have sufficient access to a number of religiously diverse
resources and institutions; units in areas that are not UAs or UCs or are
assigned to international areas may reasonably be granted a presumption of
insufficient access (or may be subject to additional analysis).
The most difficult evaluation involves units in American UCs. But such
analysis should be based upon other models that the military currently uses,
including a consideration of military housing area surveys that are presently
used for BAH determination and as well as the medical-service areas and
commuting policies currently used by Tricare. The most challenging aspect
of this evaluation will be the collection of data on the distribution of
churches, temples, synagogues, and other religious establishments within
the United States. No reliable and comprehensive source of such
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nationwide data is presently available, and other organizations’ attempts to
gather such data have been riddled with problems. The DoD’s vast
resources and experience (as illustrated by BAH and Tricare models),
however, illustrate that the military is capable of gathering and utilizing the
necessary data to determine which areas are burdened by obstacles to
religious free exercise and which are not. To ensure the constitutionality of
the chaplaincy, the courts should insist that they do so.
This analysis leaves open the question of what quantity and level of
religious diversity is “sufficient” when it comes to houses of worship and
their proximity to military bases. The first step in any reevaluation of
service member needs must focus on gathering more accurate data as to the
religious affiliations of the service members themselves. Currently, service
members’ religious affiliations are voluntarily self-reported upon initial
entry into military service. Indeed, three Army chaplains in 2000 were
listed in official statistics as having either no religious preference or no
preference recorded.228 The probable result of such haphazard and
individually identifiable reporting is inaccuracy and underreporting of
religious affiliation; data collection would be greatly improved through
more traditional survey methods.
Once reliable data has been secured as to the military’s religiously
affiliated population, the DoD’s next step should be determining the best
method for ensuring that the religious needs of non-deployable units are
met (either through local access to religious resources or through the
provision of military chaplains). Whereas proportional representation is
impractical within the chaplain’s corps, it should be a valid consideration in
analyzing the distribution of civilian houses of worship adjacent to military
posts. The DoD might, for example, require a minimum of one religious
establishment within a given radius of a military base for every group or
denomination that comprises at least 0.5% of the religiously affiliated
military population. That population could be determined based on an
annual survey. Those bases located in areas that do not meet such criteria
would have a demonstrated need for military chaplains to accommodate
service members’ free exercise rights. Accommodation might be tailored
even further by inversely correlating the number of chaplain assignments to
the number and diversity of local civilian religious resources; for example,
even if a given UC does not have sufficient houses of worship to satisfy the

228. Terry A. Dempsey, Asymmetric Threats to the U.S. Army Chaplaincy in the 21st
Century 9 (Apr. 2000) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/
ADA377952.
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religious needs of a unit’s service members, that unit may nonetheless have
better access than a rural-based unit and, accordingly, may not need as
many military chaplains as does the rural-based unit.
VII. Conclusion
In sum, chaplain assignments to various units need not be “all or
nothing,” that is, every unit is assigned a chaplain or no unit is assigned a
chaplain. However, a significant number of military units have ample
access to off-base religious services (as in heavily urbanized areas of the
United States). If the free exercise clause allows for—or even mandates—
the chaplaincy, the DoD must make some effort to distinguish between units
that are and units that are not subject to a government-imposed burden on
religious free exercise. As religious accommodation is permissible only
when government action encumbers religious free exercise, service
members’ access to religious resources must be more carefully considered
in order to ensure that the accommodation of military chaplains to various
military units truly relieves a burden.
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